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THE INFLUENCE OF LEADERSHIP STYLE AND PERSONAL COSTS ON FRAUD 
WHISTLEBLOWING INTENT 
by 
Tonya D.W. Smalls 
 
Using an experimental approach, this study examines employees’ intention to report 
occupational fraud through various channels based on the leadership style 
(transformational or transactional) of the manager and the expected personal costs (either 
high or low) of reporting. The study also focuses on the influence of value congruence 
between the manager and the employee, as well as trust factors that motivate employees 
to report occupational fraud. In examining these issues, I consider two types of 
occupational fraud schemes (misappropriation of assets and financial statement fraud). 
Unexpectedly, the results indicate leadership style and/or personal costs do not have a 
significant influence on reporting intention under most models examined in this study. 
The findings indicate that age, gender, and/or responsibility to report are significant 
factors influencing reporting intentions in several models analyzed in this study.  
 
Key Words: Employee whistleblowing; transactional leader; transformational leader; 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2014) estimates that a 
typical company loses 5 percent of its revenues to occupational fraud each year. 
Occupational fraud is defined by the ACFE (2014, 6) as “the use of one’s occupation for 
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing 
organization’s resources or assets” and is primarily grouped into the three following 
categories: misappropriation of assets, financial statement fraud, and corruption. Of all of 
the fraud cases included in the ACFE (2014, 5) study, “77% of the fraud cases were 
committed by employees working in one of the following six departments: accounting, 
operations, sales, executive/upper management, customer service, purchasing, and 
finance.” A review of corporate fraud cases between 1996 and 2004 shows that 18.3% of 
fraud cases were detected and brought forward by employees blowing the whistle (Dyck 
et al., 2010; Kaptein, 2011), and the detection of fraud is more likely to be accomplished 




Although tips represent the most common avenue by which fraud is detected, the 
establishment of whistleblower policies and procedures may not be adequate to 
encourage employees to report wrongdoing. The Ethics Resource Center (2013) reports 
an increase in retaliation against employee whistleblowers from 2007 to 2013 in 
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 The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2014 Global Fraud Study reports that the second and third 
most common methods of detecting fraud are management review (16.0%) and internal audit (14.1%). 





organizations with whistleblower policies. The organization’s culture of 
credibility will instill employee beliefs that will support or dissuade employee 
whistleblowing behaviors, and leadership behavior is a key determinant of employee 
perceptions and beliefs (Berry, 2004; Ethics Resource Center, 2013). Oumnlil and 
Balloun (2009) report that the cultural environment influences ethical decision making 
and ethical issue recognition, and organizational culture influences an employee’s 
decision to whistleblow on wrongdoing (Berry, 2004; Ethics Resource Center, 2013)  
Although there are various leadership types, leadership has been broadly 
conceptualized as either transformational or transactional (Burns, 1978; Bass & Riggio, 
2006), and current research on leadership has been dominated by transformational-
transactional leadership theory (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). “Transformational” leaders 
engage the emotional involvement of their followers to build higher levels of 
commitment, identification, and trust in the leader and the leader’s mission (Jung & 
Avolio, 2000). Transformational leaders typically encourage and empower followers to 
make their own decisions, and this builds the followers’ trust in their leader (Avolio & 
Bass, 1995). This influence on decision making may also impact an employee’s intent to 
report fraud, since transformational leaders affect followers’ performance positively, 
enhance the organizational citizenship behaviors of employees such as helping behavior 
and conscientiousness, and are more effective in helping followers cope in stressful 
situations (Bass & Riggo, 2006). In contrast, “transactional” leaders tend to motivate 
followers based on contingent reinforcement and acquire “conditional trust” from 
followers via reliable execution of exchanges and contracts (Jung & Avolio, 2000; Bass, 





a leader’s commitment to followers’ personal development is not involved, and it does 
not involve a strong emotional attachment to the leader (Jung & Avolio, 2000). A 
transactional leader is unlikely to help followers cope in uncertain conditions or stressful 
situations, is less effective than a transformational leader in a crisis or unstable situations, 
and has less influence on a follower’s organizational behavior and commitment (Bass & 
Riggio, 2006). As a result, an employee may be less likely to report fraud under a 
transactional leader. 
In response to the need for additional research on the role of management in the 
whistleblowing process (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011), this study first explores the 
influence a manager’s leadership style has on an employee’s intent to report suspected 
fraud to that manager, as well as to other parties. The specific leadership styles assessed 
in this study are transformational leadership and transactional leadership. I predict a 
greater willingness to report suspected fraud to a transformational leader than to a 
transactional leader. The mediating effects of value congruence and trust factors on the 
influence of leadership style on intent to report fraud are considered as well. I expect, 
based on the results reported in Jung and Avolio (2000), that transactional leadership will 
not have a direct effect on the intent to report fraud, and transactional leadership will 
have an indirect effect on the intent to report fraud when mediated by value congruence 
and trust. The results of Jung and Avolio (2000) also lead to the expectation that 
transformational leadership will have a direct effect on the intent to report fraud and will 
have an indirect effect to report fraud when mediated by value congruence and trust. 
Second, the influence of personal costs (either high or low) on intent to report 





examined in this study. Consistent with prior research on the influence of personal costs 
(Schultz, Johnson, Morris, & Dyrnes, 1993; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001) on ethical 
decision making, and the issue-contingent model of ethical decision making (specifically 
the magnitude of consequences component) (Jones, 1991; Cohen & Bennie, 2006), I 
expect a greater willingness to blow the whistle when personal costs are low. More 
importantly, I expect that the negative effect of high personal costs will be reduced in the 
presence of transformational leadership (an interaction between leadership style and 
personal costs, which has not been examined previously).  
Finally, in examining the effects of leadership style and personal costs, I consider 
two different fraud settings (ACFE, 2014) – asset misappropriation (employee misuses or 
steals the company’s resources such as a false billing scheme) and financial statement 
fraud (employee intentionally omits material information or causes a misstatement in the 
company’s financial reports such as understating reported expenses or inflating reported 
assets). Previous research on an employee’s intent to report fraud has examined 
whistleblowing intentions related to misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial 
reporting. The current study also examines whistleblowing response to each of these two 
categories of occupational fraud.  
Consistent with this set of fraud types, Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli (2004) 
call for additional research on the influence of type of wrongdoing on whistleblowing. As 
it relates to the influence of fraud type on the intent to report fraud, Kaplan, Pany, 
Samuels, and Zhang (2009) report that misappropriation of assets has a stronger influence 
than fraudulent financial reporting on intent to anonymously report fraud. However, 





reporting intentions. The current study addresses reporting intention by fraud type to 
understand the effects of the manipulated variables within different fraud settings. 
An experimental, 2x2 (leadership style – transformational or transactional, 
personal costs – high or low), research design is used. Leadership style and personal costs 
are manipulated between-subjects. In addition, the participants evaluate two independent 
fraud cases, with the fraud types (fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of 
assets) presented in random order. Previous studies have used MBA students to examine 
reporting intentions (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Kaplan, Pope, & 
Samuels, 2010, 2011). Likewise, the participants in this study are Executive MBA and/or 
part-time MBA students.  
Carcello et al. (2011) report that the additional protections and incentives given to 
whistleblowers by the Dodd-Frank Act will likely enhance the role of whistleblowers as 
an important internal mechanism in discovering corporate fraud. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) also provides increased protection and prohibits employers from retaliating 
against individuals who report fraud (Iyer & Watkins, 2008). Despite such protections, 
the personal costs of whistleblowing can be quite significant.  
While the MANCOVA results point primarily to Age and Responsibility as being 
associated with intent to report, some other results emerge in the individual ANCOVAs. 
Specifically, the present study finds that leadership style alone does not have a direct 
significant influence on reporting financial reporting internally or externally. Reporting 
misappropriation of assets internally is not directly influenced by leadership style. 
Leadership style does have a significant influence on reporting misappropriation of assets 





personal cost is significant in certain situations, such as reporting financial reporting 
fraud internally to a controller or reporting misappropriation of assets externally to the 
SEC. The findings of this study also document that leadership style influences concern 
about personal costs when reporting misappropriation of assets to a controller. The results 
of this study extend our current understanding of the effect that leadership style has on 
whistleblowing intent in low personal cost versus high personal cost environments.  
The findings of this study also indicate that age, gender, and/or responsibility to 
report a wrongful act are significant factors influencing the intent to report fraud in many 
of the models analyzed in this study. Age has a positive influence on the participants’ 
intent to report fraud internally (Table 8), a negative influence on the participants’ intent 
to report fraud externally (Table 11), and a negative influence on a typical manager’s 
intent to report fraud externally (Tables 7 and 9). Both gender (i.e., female participants) 
(Tables 5, 6, and 10) and responsibility (Tables 5 and 7) have positive influences on 
reporting fraud.
2
 This study extends prior research on the factors influencing internal 
employee whistleblowing and further examines the role of leadership in establishing a 
culture that encourages reporting unethical behavior, such as occupational fraud. 
Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, & Riley (2013) cite whistleblowing as an anti-fraud 
measure designed for fraud deterrence and detection, assert that whistleblowing can 
affect an organization’s control environment, and call for research on fraud detection 
methods auditors can use to identify fraud. The study of how leadership influences 
employee whistleblowing also is relevant to auditors because it has the potential to 
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 See later discussion of heteroskedasticity in certain models and the effect on the results if I use an 
















Dyck, Morse, and Zingalas (2010) study all reported corporate fraud cases in 
large U.S. organizations between 1996 and 2004, and report that fraud is not typically 
detected by corporate governance mechanisms, such as the SEC or auditors, but by other 
factors that complement each other like the media and employees. Employees are a 
critical (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008) and increasingly important (Miceli & Near, 
2005) source for detecting wrongful acts (Kaptein, 2011; ACFE, 2014). Specifically, the 
latest ACFE study (ACFE, 2014) reports that 43% of occupational fraud cases are 
discovered through tips and 50.9% of the tips are from employees. Carcello et al. (2011) 
call for research that provides insight into the role of top management in supporting or 
possibly impeding the effectiveness of whistleblower programs. Previous studies on 
factors influencing an employee’s intent to whistleblow have not examined the role of 
leadership behavior from the perspective of a specific leadership style (i.e., 
transformational versus transactional) and the influence leadership style has on an 
employee’s intent to blow the whistle on fraud. This study provides insight into how 
management’s leadership style and employee personal costs impact fraud detection as a 
result of the influence these factors have on an employee’s intent to blow the whistle on 
fraud. 
The previous studies of an employee’s intent to whistleblow have focused on 
factors influencing the intent, such as the existence of anonymous reporting channels, 
procedural safeguards in anonymous reporting channels, the presence or absence of 





 the auditor actually inquires about wrongdoing (e.g., Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; 
Kaplan et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2010; Kaplan et al., 2011). More broadly, the literature 
on the intent to blow the whistle on wrongdoing is clustered around four primary themes: 
(1) Anonymous and Non-anonymous Reporting Channels, (2) Internal and External 
Reporting Channels, (3) Ethical Organizational Culture, and (4) Personal Cost. The 
following sections discuss the literature within each of these four themes, recognizing 
that the studies discussed often include other variables beyond the main theme.  
Anonymous and Non-anonymous Reporting  
Three studies have directly examined anonymous and non-anonymous reporting 
channels. First, Ayers and Kaplan (2005) examine an employee’s intent to report 
wrongdoing by an outside consultant using an anonymous or non-anonymous reporting 
channel. The independent variables in this study were the perceived seriousness of the 
wrongdoing, personal cost and personal responsibility of reporting the wrongdoing which 
were adopted from Schultz et al. (1993), and moral equity, relativism, and contractualism 
which are ethical dimensions in the multidimensional ethics scale (MES) developed in 
Reidenbach and Robin (1990). This study was completed by 74 graduate business school 
students in a between-subjects experiment in which one set of subjects received one 
version of the case (consultants increase profitability $300,000 by using inexperienced 
staff with lower bill rates) and the other set of subjects received an alternative version of 
the case (consultants overbill the client $300,000 to recoup costs associated with taking 
longer to complete assignment because consultant misunderstood a portion of the 
assignment). The findings of Ayers and Kaplan (2005) indicate that personal costs and 





anonymously. The influence of personal costs on reporting intentions in the anonymous 
and non-anonymous reporting channels were similar even though the personal costs were 
lower in the anonymous reporting channel compared to the non-anonymous channel. 
Personal responsibility and moral equity judgments are significantly related to reporting 
non-anonymously, but not anonymously. The influence of relativism and contractualism 
was not significant in either the non-anonymous or anonymous reporting environments. 
The findings of Ayers and Kaplan (2005) indicate intentions to report anonymously are 
impacted by cost-benefit considerations. The current study further explores and expands 
knowledge on the influence personal cost has on intentions to report fraud using an 
anonymous reporting channel.  
Second, Kaplan and Schultz (2007) examine intent to report questionable acts by 
exploring response to different type of fraudulent acts and focus on the availability of an 
anonymous or non-anonymous reporting channel in the organization. In addition to the 
anonymity of the reporting channel, the study examined whether the quality of the 
organization’s internal audit department influenced reporting intentions. In this study, 93 
evening MBA students participated in a within-subjects experiment and responded to 
three different scenarios involving financial reporting fraud, theft, and false 
representations by consultants. The findings of Kaplan and Schultz (2007) indicate that 
internal audit department quality does not influence whether an anonymous or non-
anonymous reporting channel is used. However, when an anonymous reporting channel is 
available, individuals are less likely to use a non-anonymous reporting channel. The 
findings also indicate that the type of wrongdoing influences reporting intentions because 





misappropriation of assets fraud type scenarios; reporting intentions by fraud types are 
higher than the false representation by consultant scenario). These results by fraud type 
are consistent with Kaplan et al. (2010), which did not find significant variation in 
reporting intention by type of fraudulent act. 
Third, Kaplan et al. (2009) further examine the intent to anonymously report fraud 
and explore the influence that externally versus internally administering (along with other 
procedural safeguards) an anonymous hotline has on fraud reporting. This study uses 91 
evening MBA students in a between-subjects experimental design. The strength of 
procedural safeguards (which are either weak or strong) and the fraud type 
(misappropriation of assets or financial reporting fraud) are used as predictors of 
reporting intention. Characteristics that distinguished between strong or weak procedural 
safeguards related to whether the hotline was administered externally (considered strong) 
or internally (considered weak), the operating hours the hotline was available for use, 
mechanisms in place to follow-up on hotline calls, and description of controls in place to 
safeguard information reported. The results of the study unexpectedly show that reporting 
intentions were higher when procedural safeguards were weaker. Kaplan et al. (2009) 
speculate that participants may view reporting to an externally administered hotline as 
reporting to an outsider, and are less reluctant to report fraud internally versus externally 
regardless of the procedural safeguards. Kaplan et al. (2009) also report that the intent to 
report fraud was higher for the scenario involving misappropriation of assets than the 
scenario related to financial reporting fraud.  
Overall, this area of research indicates that an anonymous reporting channel is 





options are available. The findings in this area of research on the influence of fraud type 
on reporting intentions (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2009) are inconsistent. 
The findings of Kaplan and Schultz (2007) related to the influence of fraud type on 
reporting intentions are consistent with the findings in the next section. Inconsistencies in 
prior research provide an opportunity to further explore the influence that fraud type has 
on reporting intentions. The present study seeks to expand the literature by examining the 
influence fraud type has on intent to anonymously report fraud.  
Internal and External Reporting Channels 
Whistleblowing via internal channels is less threatening to a company as 
compared to external reporting, which could potentially lead to scrutiny from the public 
or legal intervention (Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991). Previous research on 
whistleblowing has explored the internal-external reporting issue from a variety of 
perspectives. First, Kaplan et al. (2009) examine internal versus external reporting as it 
relates to the administration of the hotline. The results of Kaplan et al. (2009) indicate 
that reporting intentions to an internally administered hotline were significantly stronger 
than reporting intentions to an externally administered hotline. The findings were 
unexpected because the internally administered hotline had weaker procedural safeguards 
than the externally administered hotline 
Second, Kaplan et al. (2010) specifically examine environments and 
circumstances that influence an individual’s intention to internally report fraud. They 
examine the impact of unsuccessful social confrontation (such as speaking directly to an 
individual who committed the fraudulent act and the discussion does not result in the 





with one’s supervisor and the influence this has on the individual’s intention to report 
fraud (misappropriation of assets or fraudulent financial reporting) to the supervisor’s 
supervisor or to internal audit. Kaplan et al. (2010) find that employees experiencing a 
social confrontation that is not successful are more likely to pursue powerful internal 
report recipients, whereas reporting to the supervisor’s supervisor was viewed as the 
preferred channel when social confrontation did not occur. The study also finds that 
reporting intention did not vary based on the type of fraudulent act. 
Third, Kaplan, Pope and Samuels (2011) study whether reporting intentions are 
stronger when an auditor makes inquiries or does not make inquiries to an employee, and 
whether the auditors are internal or external. The results of the study, using 207 evening 
MBA students, show that reporting intention to an inquiring auditor is greater than 
reporting intention to a non-inquiring auditor. The reporting intention to an internal 
auditor is stronger than reporting intention to an external auditor. There is an interaction 
effect between inquiry and auditor type, specifically that inquiry strengthens the reporting 
intentions to an external auditor more than the reporting intentions to an internal auditor. 
There is no significant difference in reporting intentions for fraud type (misappropriation 
of assets or fraudulent financial reporting). 
Overall the research in this area indicates that individuals are more likely to report 
wrongdoing internally than externally. The preference for internal reporting is present in 
findings associated with the administration channel of an anonymous reporting hotline 
and the type of auditor who is the report recipient. The current study extends prior 
research on the influence fraud type has on the intent to report fraud internally and 





Ethical Organizational Culture 
Bather and Kelly (2006) report that whistleblowing is most effective in 
organizations that encourage whistleblowing instead of resenting the act of 
whistleblowing and punishing the whistleblower. Studies have specifically examined the 
intent to report wrongdoing in environments that are perceived to have ethical cultures, 
based on the ethics of supervisors and coworkers and the ethics of specific professions. 
First, Mayer, Nurmohamed, Trevino, Shapiro, and Schminke (2013) examine the 
influence of ethical leadership of supervisors and ethical behavior of co-workers on 
employees’ intent to internally report unethical conduct using three studies. Study 1 is a 
survey completed by 197 new hires of a multinational company and examines intent to 
whistleblow. Study 2 is a field study of 33,756 employees that examines actual reporting 
behavior. Study 3 is an experiment that examines the interaction between supervisory 
ethical leadership and ethical behavior of a co-worker. The studies explore the interaction 
between the ethical leadership of the supervisor and ethical behavior of the co-worker, 
mediated by fear of retaliation. Study 3 includes an additional mediator called perceptions 
of futility. Each study uses 10, 3, and 6 items, respectively, from the Brown et al. (2005) 
ethical leadership scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 or 7 (strongly agree) to 
measure supervisory ethical leadership and a three-item coworker ethical behavior scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 or 7 (strongly agree). Mayer et al. (2013) find that 
an employee’s decision to internally report unethical behavior depends on the ethical tone 
established by the employee’s supervisor and co-workers. The interactive effect of ethical 
leadership of the supervisor and the ethical behavior of the coworker was mediated by 






Second, Shawver and Clements (2008) examine the accounting professional’s 
evaluation of unethical situations and intentions to blow the whistle on wrongdoing. One 
area examined as an influence on reporting intentions is the ethical climate of the 
organization. The study was completed by 89 individuals attending an Institute of 
Management Accountants conference. The results of the study show that accounting 
professionals are not more likely to whistle blow when working for a firm with a high 
ethical climate as opposed to a firm with a low ethical climate. The study also reports that 
accounting professionals are able to identify unethical situations and are more (less) 
likely to blow the whistle on situations with higher (lower) materiality and when job 
guarantees exist (does not), distress levels are low (high), and a sense of security exists 
(does not).   
Third, Taylor and Curtis (2013) examine the influence prior organizational 
response and power distance has on a public accounting professional’s intention to report 
wrongdoing. Taylor and Curtis (2013, 23) define power distance as the “relative 
hierarchical distance between the wrongdoer and the potential reporter,” and the 
wrongdoer in the study is either a peer or a superior. The study was completed by 106 
audit supervisors attending a training conference for a Big 4 firm. The study finds that 
audit supervisors reporting intentions are not influenced by the organization’s response to 
prior whistleblowing incidents. The results of the study also show that power distance 
influences intent to report wrongdoing. The results of the interaction of prior 





report on a peer (superior) are higher (lower) when the organization is unresponsive as 
compared to a responsive.  
Overall, this area of research suggests that intent to report wrongdoing is not 
influenced by the overall culture of the company, but is influenced by the ethical tone 
established by supervisors and co-workers. This area of research also finds that intent to 
blow the whistle on unethical conduct is influenced by the fear of retaliation, job 
guarantee, distress level, and sense of security factors examined as personal cost factors 
in the research explored in the next section. The current study examines the influence a 
supervisor’s leadership style and personal cost have on the intent to blow the whistle on 
fraud.  
Personal Costs 
 Research has examined the effects of personal costs on the intent to blow the 
whistle. Schultz, Johnson, Morris, and Dyrnes (1993) examine how an individual’s 
perception of responsibility to report wrongdoing relate to an organization’s internal 
control environment, the perceived personal cost of reporting the questionable act, and 
the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing influence the decision to report the 
questionable act in America, France, and Norway. The study used the Hofstede’s Value 
Survey Module and six scenarios to determine influence on reporting intentions. The 
perceived seriousness of the irregularity measure in Schultz et al. (1993) is similar to the 
moral intensity measure examined in Taylor and Curtis (2010). Schultz et al. (1993) use 
six different scenarios in a within-subjects experiment with 145 individuals (mid-level 
managers and professional staff), and predicted there would be a negative correlation 





between reporting and perceptions of seriousness and responsibility. The results were 
statistically significant in the expected direction. As it relates to the international 
constructs introduced in this study, the results indicate that the variables examined have 
different levels of importance in different countries. The results indicate that reporting 
intention is influenced by national factors and specific situations, such as national cultural 
values related to power distance acceptance and strength of uncertainty avoidance
3
, 
personnel ranking of perpetrator, whether the issue was an accounting or non-accounting 
matter, and the prosperity of company. The results of the study also indicate that in 
general the perceived seriousness of the act influences the reporting intention, although 
this prediction did not hold in the American sample specifically. 
 Similar to Schultz et al. (1993), the influence of perceptions of seriousness of the 
questionable act, the personal costs of reporting, the responsibility for reporting are also 
examined in Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001). Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) explore 
these factors, as well as professional commitment, on an auditor’s reporting intention 
when is it identified that another auditor is considering taking a job with a client and the 
auditor has failed to comply with the ethics rules. Personal costs in this study include 
potential retaliation with weaker performance evaluation ratings, alienation due to peers 
not wanting to work with a whistleblower, and consequences of being an accomplice if 
the act is not reported. The subjects in this study are 73 audit seniors. Kaplan and 
Whitecotton (2001) find that intent to report is higher when personal costs of reporting 
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 Hofstede (1984) defines power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Power distance is the degree to which 
a society accepts that power is unequally distributed in institutions and organizations. Individuals in large 
power distance societies are more accepting of hierarchical order and those in small power distance 
societies support the equalization of power. Uncertainty avoidance relates to the extent in which members 
of society are uncomfortable vagueness and uncertainty. Strong uncertainty avoidance societies lack 
tolerance for persons and ideas that are deviant. Weak uncertainty avoidance societies are less rigid and 





are perceived to be lower, and reporting intentions are higher when personal 
responsibility is perceived to be higher. These results are consistent with the findings in 
Schultz et al. (1993). The study predicted that increases in the perceived seriousness of 
the act would positively influence the auditors’ reporting intention. The findings did not 
support this prediction, and it is speculated that the results are consistent with the U.S. 
portion of the results of the Schultz et al. (1993) study due to national cultural norms. 
Overall, Schultz et al. (1993) and Kaplan and Whitecotton (2001) examine the 
influence of personal cost on an individual’s likelihood to report wrongdoing and find 
that individuals are more likely to report wrongdoing when the perceived personal cost, 
such as risk of reprisal or sanctions imposed by management or peers, is low. The current 
study expands our knowledge of the influence of personal cost on reporting intentions by 
examining the interaction of leadership style (transformational and transactional) and 






Leadership and Ethical Employee Outcomes 
There are numerous studies (Hood, 2003; Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 2005; 
Tuan, 2012; Mayer et al., 2013; Taylor & Curtis, 2013) that examine the role of 
leadership and the influence of leadership on ethical decision making or creating an 
ethical organization climate. In addition, Carcello et al. (2011) call for research that 
provides insight into the role of top management in supporting or possibly impeding the 
effectiveness of whistleblower programs. For the purposes of this study, research will be 
discussed to establish the link between leadership style and employee outcomes, such as 
the intent to report wrongdoing. 
Transformational and Transactional Leadership 
This paper will investigate the role that the leadership style of a manager has on 
an employee’s intent to blow the whistle on fraud, specifically occupational fraud. The 
leadership styles examined in this study are transformational leadership and transactional 
leadership. 
Transformational leaders engage the emotional involvement of their followers to 
establish higher levels of commitment, identification, and trust in the leader and the 
leader’s mission (Jung & Avolio, 2000). They also work to increase their followers’ 
confidence and expand their needs in line with what they have established as the terms of 
their group’s mission (Avolio & Bass, 1995). Transformational leaders typically 
encourage and empower followers to make their own decisions, and this builds the 





Transactional leaders tend to motivate followers based on contingent 
reinforcement and acquire what may be termed “conditional trust” from followers via 
reliable execution of contracts and exchanges (Jung & Avolio, 2000; Bass, 1985; 
Meyerson et al., 1996). Transactional leaders can be effective in stable and predictable 
environments (Bass & Riggio, 2006). However, the transactional leadership style does 
not involve a leader’s commitment toward followers’ personal development, and it does 
not involve a strong emotional attachment to the leader (Jung & Avolio, 2000).  
Hood (2003) explores the relationship among CEO values, leadership style, and 
ethical orientation. The values of the CEO were developed by Rokeach (1973) and are 
categorized in Hood (2003) as morality based values (affection, forgiveness, helpfulness, 
politeness, and responsibility), personal values (broadmindedness, courage, honesty, and 
self-respect), social values (equality, freedom, and world at peace), and competency 
based values (competence and logic). Hood (2003) uses the Multifactor Leadership 
Questionnaire (Avolio & Bass, 1995) to measure leadership style, and ethical orientation 
is measured by whether a formal ethics policy or company training program exists.  
The results of Hood (2003) indicate that each of the four types of values is 
significantly associated with transformational leadership; transactional leadership is 
positively related to personal values and morality-based values. The results also indicate 
that social and morality based values are directly associated with formal ethics policies 
and the existence of company diversity training. Hood (2003) also reports that 
transactional leaders appear to follow ethical practices that are legal, while in contrast, 





law by implementing more voluntary ethical and socially responsible practices within 
their companies.  
Value congruence is the amount of overlap that exists between an individual’s 
personal values and the values he or she perceives to exist in leadership or the 
organization (Cazier, Shao, & St. Louis, 2007). There are a variety of ways to define 
“values”. It has been defined as normative beliefs about preferred or desired results and 
the proper standards of conduct (Nystrom, 1990). Rokeach (1973) defines value systems 
as an enduring group of beliefs regarding preferable modes of conduct or end-states of 
existence along a range of relative importance. Liedtka (1989) notes that values serve as 
important determinants of behavior and provide criteria for decision making. Krishnan 
(2002) reports that value congruence implies harmony in the relationship between leaders 
and followers, and that transformational leadership is positively related to leader-follower 
value system congruence.  
Jung and Avolio (2000) study the effect of transformational and transactional 
leadership styles on performance, when mediated by trust and value congruence. 
Performance in the study related to participants working on a brainstorming project 
responsible for making recommendations to improve the quality of the education 
provided by a business school, and performance was objectively measured by the 
quantity and quality of the recommendations generated, and subjectively measured by the 
participants’ satisfaction with the leader. They find transformational leadership has a 
strong direct positive effect on performance, and transformational leadership has an 
indirect effect on performance when transformational leadership is mediated through the 





leadership, Jung and Avolio (2000) find transactional leadership does not have a positive 
direct effect on performance. Jung and Avolio (2000) report that transactional leadership 
only has indirect effects on performance when transactional leadership is mediated 
through the followers’ trust and value congruence, even though transactional leaders are 
primarily focused on task completion.  
Building on this work, Tuan (2012) studies the relation between transformational 
leadership and ethical behavior. Tuan finds that transformational leadership fosters 
knowledge-based and identity-based trust, and notes that these trust dimensions are 
correlated with a lower degree of unethical behavior. The results also show a direct link 
between transformational leadership and a lower degree of unethical behavior such as 
bribery, lying, and personal gain. The results of Tuan (2012) indicate that 
transformational leadership can lead to the development of ethical corporate social 
responsibility. The third trust dimension examined in the study is calculus-based trust, 
which is correlated with a higher degree of unethical behavior and more closely related to 
transactional leadership. Based on this discussion, transformational leadership has been 
linked to having a positive influence on performance and to ethical behavior, but it has 
not been examined in relation to whistleblowing. This paper extends previous research by 
focusing on whistleblowing as a form of ethical performance. 
The previous studies do not examine the influence transformational and 
transactional leadership behavior has on the intent to blow the whistle on fraud. Mayer et 
al. (2013) examine ethical leadership on intent to report unethical conduct in general, but 
not related specifically to occupational fraud. In addition, research indicates that although 





transactional leadership styles, ethical leadership is distinct and different from 
transformational and transactional leadership styles (Brown et al., 2005). Brown and 
Trevino (2006) report that although ethical leadership is significantly correlated with 
certain dimensions of transformational leadership, such as the idealized influence 
dimension, the moral management dimension of ethical leadership is more consistent 
with the transactional leadership style. It is also noted that the intellectually stimulating 
and visionary aspects of transformational leadership are not included in the construct of 
ethical leadership (Brown & Trevino, 2006). Thus, the current literature does not focus on 
the influence on an employee’s intent to blow the whistle on fraud from the perspective 
of a specific leadership style. This study examines this current gap in the literature. The 
specific leadership styles examined in this study are transformational leadership and 
transactional leadership. Jung and Avolio (2000) find no direct positive relationship 
between transactional leadership and performance. The positive direct and indirect 
influence that transformational leadership has on performance compared to transactional 
leadership (Avolio & Bass, 1995; Jung & Avolio, 2000) and the influence 
transformational leadership has on ethical performance (Tuan, 2012) lead to the 
following directional hypothesis. 
H1: An employee’s intention to blow the whistle on fraud is greater under a 
transformational leader than under a transactional leader.  
Leadership Style and Personal Costs 
Previous studies have examined the relation between personal costs and an 
individual’s intent to report wrongdoing (Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 





intentions are higher when personal costs are low (Jones, 1991; Schultz et al., 1993; 
Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001; Cohen & Bennie, 2006; Shawer & Clements, 2008; Mayer 
et al.; 2013). Previous research on the influence leadership style on ethical behavior and 
performance indicates that transformational leadership has a positive effect on ethical 
behavior and performance (Jung & Avolio, 2000; Tuan, 2012). When personal costs are 
high, reporting intentions are lower (Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001).  
I examine the interaction of leadership style (transformational or transactional) 
and personal costs to understand whether transformational leadership has a greater effect 
on intent to blow the whistle when personal costs are high, rather than low. Previous 
studies have not examined the interaction of leadership style and personal costs. I expect 
that when personal costs are low, leadership style will have less influence on reporting 
intentions, since many people will report. However, when personal costs are high, the 
leadership style of the manager should become more relevant to the more difficult 
decision of whether to report. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The effect of leadership style on the intent to blow the whistle on fraud is 
more pronounced when personal costs are higher than when personal costs are 
lower.  
Value system congruence between leader and follower is one of the most 
important characteristics of transformational leadership (Krishnan, 2002). Podsakoff, 
Mackenzie, Moorman, and Fetter (1990, 108) report that “transformational leadership 
influenced followers’ organizational citizenship behaviors only indirectly, in that it was 
mediated by the followers’ level of trust in the leader.” Jung and Avolio (2000) study the 





mediated by trust and value congruence. Existing research studies do not examine the 
relationship between leadership styles, trust, value congruence, and whistleblowing.   
Person-organization fit relates to an individual preferring an organization that 
possesses characteristics (such as values, beliefs) that are similar to their own (Amos & 
Weathington, 2008; Kroeger, 1995). Amos and Weathington (2008) report that person-
organization fit is essential to companies because it suggests that if individuals fit well 
with a company, they are likely to demonstrate more positive attitudes and behaviors, 
such as internal whistleblowing which is a positive behavior encouraged in the workplace 
and that is beneficial to an organization (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Miceli, Near, & 
Dworkin, 2009). Value congruence is the amount of overlap between an individual’s 
personal values and the values he perceives to exist in leadership or the organization 
(Cazier et al., 2007). Jung and Avolio (2000) report that when a follower’s values are 
compatible with the transformational leader’s values, it is expected that the follower will 
shift motivation from focusing on self-interest to considering the more collective interests 
of the group or organization.  
The influence of personal values on ethical decision making has also been studied 
(Fritzsche, 1995). Trust has been researched from the employee’s or subordinate’s 
viewpoint and the influence of perceived trustworthiness on work attitudes and 
organizational citizenship behavior (Lester & Brower, 2003). It has been shown that 
value congruence, when mediated by trust, has a positive impact on information 
disclosure by individuals (Cazier et al., 2007). Jung and Avolio (2000) report that 
transformational leadership has a strong indirect influence on performance, mediated 





leadership which also had an indirect influence on performance, but not as strong of an 
effect. Tuan (2012) reports the positive influence transformational leadership has on 
performance and ethical behavior. In the present study, whistleblowing is a form of 
ethical performance (Gatewood & Carroll, 1991; Miceli et al., 2009; Selvarajan & 
Sardessai, 2010). This discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
H3a: Transformational leadership, mediated through trust, will have a positive 
influence on an employee’s intent to whistleblow on fraud. 
H3b: Transformational leadership, mediated through value congruence, will have 




 In addition to the hypotheses above, I also examine one research question. The 
influence leadership style or personal cost has on the intent to whistleblow on fraud may 
vary by fraud type. The effect of fraud type (misappropriation of assets or fraudulent 
financial reporting) on reporting intention has been examined in prior research (Kaplan & 
Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2010), and the results have been 
inconsistent. Kaplan et al. (2009) report higher intent to report fraud for a 
misappropriation of assets scenario than a scenario related to financial reporting fraud. 
Kaplan and Schultz (2007) and Kaplan et al. (2010) both report no significant variation in 
reporting by type of fraudulent act. The conflicting results from prior studies regarding 
the influence of fraud type on reporting intention motivates the following research 
question: 
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RQ1: Do the effects of leadership style or personal cost on the intent to blow the 
whistle on fraud vary by fraud type? 
The focus of this RQ is whether the basic pattern of results varies between the fraudulent 
financial reporting conditions and the misappropriation of assets conditions. The focus is 





CHAPTER 3 - METHODS 
 
Design 
 An experimental, 2x2 research design is used. The manipulated independent 
variables are LEADERSHIP STYLE (two types: Transformational and Transactional) and 
PERSONAL COSTS (two types: Low and High). Leadership style and personal costs are 
manipulated between-subjects. In addition, the participants evaluate two independent 
fraud cases (FRAUD TYPE of Misappropriation of Assets and Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting), with the fraud types presented in random order. Trust and Value Congruence 
are measured variables included in the study that use a five-point scale that reflects 1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The dependent variable in this study is the 
participant’s intent to blow the whistle on suspected fraud, and I examine intent to report 
anonymously, to the Controller, or to the SEC.  
Instrument 
The participants are given an experimental instrument that describes the 
background of a hypothetical manufacturing company I created for the purpose of this 
study, since manufacturing is a common industry for fraud (ACFE, 2014). The 
manufacturing company in this study is described as being publicly-traded and 
specializes in supplying repair and maintenance materials and supplies to industrial and 
commercial facilities worldwide. The organizational structure of the company is 
summarized, and the participants are informed that their position in the organization 
structure is the Finance Manager, reporting directly to the Controller. The instrument 
places participants into one of two leadership style conditions (transformational or 





In order to ensure the personal cost positions do not impact the leadership style 
manipulation, the personal costs focus on the potential for peer retaliation, as opposed to 
management retaliation. Two types of fraud are presented in two different scenarios in 
random order.  
 In response to the scenarios, participants are asked to indicate their intent to blow 
the whistle on the fraudulent acts (to various parties). Participants are also asked to 
provide responses to questions regarding their perceptions of whistleblowing and 
whistleblower protections, manipulation check questions, and questions about their 
backgrounds. 
 The instrument was pre-tested for understandability and readability by 43 
undergraduate forensic accounting students and five academic researchers. The feedback 
and recommendations provided during pre-testing were appropriately incorporated before 
the final instrument was developed and administered. A full copy of the instrument is 







The type of leadership style for the supervisor is manipulated at two levels: 
transformational leadership style and transactional leadership style. The participants 
receive cases that provide the characteristics of the supervisor as depicted through the 
content of a speech the supervisor gives to staff during a recent staff meeting. These 
descriptions are based on the transformational and transactional leadership characteristics 
and behaviors reported in Bass (1985), Podsakoff et al. (1990), and Jung and Avolio 
(2000). 
Similar to Jung and Avolio (2000), a Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire 
(MLQ) is used to assess transformational and transactional leadership characteristics 
using a five-point scale that reflects 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. I used 18 
questions from the MLQ as manipulation check questions, and the participants’ answers 
to the questions serve as a measure of their interpretation of the leadership style presented 
to them.  
Personal Cost 
This variable is manipulated at two levels: high or low. This manipulation relates 
to whether the circumstances presented in the scenario reflect high or low personal cost. 
The scenarios provide a distinction between a high or low personal cost factors regarding 
the risk of reprisal or whether the participant will be penalized or sanctioned by his/her 
peers (Schultz et al., 1993; Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005). 





There are two different, independent fraud types presented in this study: 
misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting. Participants receive a 
scenario for each fraud type, and the order in which the fraud types are presented to the 
participants is randomized. The misappropriation of assets scenario involves a suspected 
fictitious billing scheme, since fraudulent disbursement via a billing scheme is a common 
fraudulent activity (Kaplan et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2010) across industries and 
accounts for approximately 22.4% of fraud cases in the manufacturing industry (ACFE, 
2014), which is used as the setting for this study. The fraudulent financial reporting 
scenario reflects an accounting manager who is inflating gross revenue by using 
aggressive revenue recognition practices, since revenue overstatement via the reporting 
of fictitious revenue is a common fraudulent activity across industries (Kaplan et al., 
2009; ACFE, 2014).  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is this study is the likelihood of the participant’s intent to 
report suspected fraud. This study employs a nine-point scale that ranges from “none” = 1 
to “extremely likely” = 9.
5
 There are three possible reporting channels in this study. 
Participants provide intentions for reporting fraud anonymously, directly to the 
Controller, and directly to the SEC. Participants are asked to provide their own reporting 
intentions as well as their thoughts on the reporting intentions of a “typical” manager. 
Therefore, there are a total of 12 “likelihood to report” questions (six per fraud scenario). 
The “typical” manager questions use the same nine-point scale.  
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& Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2010, 2011) have used a seven-point reporting intention 
scale that ranges from “extremely unlikely” = 1 to “extremely likely” = 7.  This current study uses a nine-






The survey instrument also includes six questions (three for each fraud scenario) 
regarding the participants’ concern about the personal costs if they report the wrongdoing. 
The nine-point scale for the personal cost concern questions ranges from “not at all 
concerned” = 1 to “extremely concerned” = 9. Previous research reports that people 
usually believe they are more ethical than their peers (Randall & Fernandes, 1991). Also, 
to analyze a social desirability bias
6
 (Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1998, 2001; Chung & 
Monroe, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2011), the differences between the results of the 
participants’ “you” report results and the “typical manager” reports results also are 
analyzed in each fraud scenario in this study and equate to six additional dependent 
measures.  
Models 
Based on the discussion above and the control variables discussed below, the 
MANCOVA and ANCOVA models used to test the hypotheses are: 
Intent to Report (several variations of this) = f (Leadership Style, Personal Cost, 
Leadership Style X Personal Cost, Gender, Age, Public Company, Responsibility) 
The identification of control variables is somewhat exploratory, as prior literature 
does not provide a consistent listing of control variables to consider when examining 
intent to report fraud. The use of Public Company as a control variable is consistent with 
prior literature that examines fraud prevention, internal control elements, and internal 
control strength by public companies and nonpublic companies, and finds that public 
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companies typically have more effective internal controls (Hermanson, Smith, & 
Stephens, 2012). Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran’s (2005) meta-analysis provides 
results that identify gender, age, and responsibility as factors influencing whistleblowing. 
They find that females are more likely than males to whistleblow, older employees are 
more likely to have an intent to whistleblow, there is a positive relationship between role 
responsibility and reporting internally, and there is a negative correlation between role 
responsibility and reporting externally. Taylor and Curtis (2013) explore the influence of 
gender on whistleblowing in audit firms, and the results of the study indicate that females 
are less likely to whistleblow. The influence of gender and age on whistleblowing is also 
analyzed in Near and Miceli’s (1996) meta-analysis, and the study reports that males and 
older individuals are more likely to blow the whistle. The positive influence  of perceived 
personal responsibility on reporting intention (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005) and the positive 
influence perceived responsibility has on fraud detection (DeZoort, Harrison, & Schnee, 
2012) are explored in prior literature. The identification of gender, age, public company 
organizational type, and responsibility as factors associated with whistleblowing and 
fraud detection in prior research is consistent with these factors being used as control 
variables in this study. 
Participants 
Previous studies have used MBA students to examine whistleblower reporting 
intentions (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2010, 2011). I 
identified participants for the study by submitting requests to Business School Deans, 
Accounting Program Directors, and/or Accounting Professors at seven universities with 





provide access to the students in their respective Executive/Professional MBA programs. 
I was allowed to either administer the instrument during class time (allotted time at the 
beginning of class to request participants and provide a copy of the instrument to 
participant for them complete and return to me via USPS mail) or mail materials directly 
to students in the Executive/Professional MBA programs for them to complete and return 
to me via USPS mail. I approached 166 students in person to complete the instrument 
during class time or return via USPS mail subsequent to class. Ninety-eight (59%) 
completed and returned the instrument. I mailed 155 instruments, of which 70 (45%) 
overlapped with students I had initially approached in class at one of the institutions I 
visited in person. To ensure students did not complete the instrument twice, I enclosed a 
letter in the mailing that informed students that they should not complete the survey if 
they already completed the survey in class during my in-person visit. A copy of the 
correspondence is included in Appendix B. Excluding the 70 students who overlapped as 
a result of an in-person participation request, 85 students were mailed a request to 
participate in my study, of which 11 (12.9%) were returned completed and eight (9.4%) 
were returned for inaccurate addresses. From these efforts, 109 Executive/Professional 
MBA students participated in the study, for a participation rate of 43%.
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CHAPTER 4 – DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Manipulation Checks 
Eighteen questions from the Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire (Jung & 
Avolio, 2000) are used to assess transformational and transactional leadership 
characteristics using a five-point scale that reflects 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree. Ten questions related to transformational leadership characteristics, and eight 
questions related to transactional leadership characteristics. The participants reference a 
speech given by their supervisor in the case setting and respond to the MLQ questions. 
See Appendix C for a table that reflects how the speech for each leadership style 
condition was constructed to ensure equivalence in speech length and appropriate 
depiction of leadership style. The effectiveness of the manipulation is evaluated based on 
the MLQ score (transformational compared to transactional) for the participant. The 
leadership style receiving the highest score represents the leadership style that the 
participant associates with the leader in the case. Specifically, the MLQ score indicates 
whether the participant perceived the leader to be transformational or transactional, and if 
this MLQ assessment matches the participant’s experimental condition, then s/he passed 
this manipulation check. 
One question is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the personal cost 
manipulation in the instrument. Participants are asked to indicate whether individuals 
suspected of whistleblowing at the company are or are not “considered troublemakers by 
their peers, isolated by their peers, or receive the cold shoulder from their peers”. 
 A total of 109 Executive/Professional MBA students completed the instrument. I 





Nine participants failed the leadership manipulation, and eight failed the personal 
cost manipulation.
8
 An additional four participants (3.7%) are excluded for missing data. 
The remaining 80 participants are included in the study.
9
  
Participants’ Perception of the Case 
Participants responded to questions that provided feedback on how realistic (1 = 
Not at all realistic, 5 = Very realistic) and how understandable (1 = Not at all 
understandable, 5 = Very understandable) they found the case. The participants found the 
case realistic (mean of 3.85, S.D. = 0.86) and understandable (mean of 4.31, S.D. = 0.87). 
The means for realistic and understandable are significantly greater than the scale 
midpoint of 3 (p < 0.001). 
Demographics 
The demographics for the 80 participants are shown in Table 1. The majority of 
the participants are male (67.5%), over the age of 29 (76.2%), and work full-time 
(90.0%). Most participants work for companies that are not publicly traded (66.2%) and 
serve in roles that are Manager level and above (58.8%). Executive/Professional MBA 
students were utilized in this study. The highest level of education for most of the 
                                                 
8
 The majority of the participants who failed either the leadership style or personal cost manipulation are 
male (12 of the 17 or 70.6%), and the highest level of education for 12 of the 17 (70.6%) is a Bachelors 
degree. There are eight participants who failed both manipulation checks. Seven of the eight participants 
(87.5%) who failed both manipulation checks are male, the highest level of education for seven of the eight 
(87.5%) is a Masters degree, 37.5% are under 30 years old, 25% are 30-35 years old, 25% are 36-40 years 
old, and 12.5% are 41-45 years old; 62.5% are employed in Manager level positions. 
9
 In addition, I ran the full ANCOVA models including participants who failed manipulation checks. The 
results (n = 105) are generally consistent with results in Tables 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 13. Gender is not 
significant in Table 5 model, and Age is not significant in Table 9 model; however, Public Company 
becomes significant in Table 10 model, and Age becomes significant in Table 13 model). The models in 
Tables 7, 11, 12, and 14 are not significant when participants who failed the manipulation checks are 
included; however, two other models (Personal Cost Concern if You Report Financial Reporting Fraud to 
Controller and Report Misappropriation of Assets to Controller: Likelihood Difference between You and 






participants is a Bachelors degree, and a small percentage have already earned a Masters 
level degree or above (6.3%). 
Table 1 
Demographics 
(n = 80) 
  Number Percentage 
Age    
 Under 30 19 23.8% 
 30-35 27 33.8% 
 36-40 18 22.5% 
 41-45 10 12.5% 
 Over 45 6 7.5% 
Gender    
 Male 54 67.5% 
 Female 26 32.5% 
Highest Education    
 Bachelors 73 91.2% 
 Masters 3 3.8% 
 JD 2 2.5% 
  MD 2 2.5% 
Job Level    
 Executive 16 20.0% 
 Director 11 13.8% 
 Manager 20 25.0% 
 Staff 13 16.2% 
 Technical 18 22.5% 
 Other/No response* 
 
2 2.5% 
Employed by Public or   




 Public 27 33.8% 
 Non-Public 53 66.2% 
    
Employed Full-time or     
Not Full-time    
 Full-time 72 90.0% 
 Not Full-time**          8 10.0% 
* No response provided  







Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables are presented in Table 2. 
Participants are equally likely to report financial reporting fraud anonymously and to 
report financial reporting fraud to a Controller (means of 6.15 and 6.45, respectively, on a 
scale of 1= “none” and 9 = “extremely likely; t-test for difference has p = 0.4662). 
Participants are neutral about reporting financial reporting fraud to the SEC (mean of 
Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting Fraud to SEC = 4.01, S.D. = 2.457). Both of 
the means of reporting financial reporting fraud anonymously and to a Controller are 
higher than the mean for reporting to the SEC (p < 0.001 in both cases). The participants 
indicated that a typical manager is more likely to report financial reporting fraud 
anonymously than to a Controller (mean of Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Financial Reporting Fraud Anonymously = 5.58, S.D. = 2.145, the mean of Likelihood 
Typical Manager Reports Financial Reporting Fraud to the Controller = 4.84, S.D. = 
2.230, t-test for difference has p = 0.016), and the mean of Likelihood Typical Manager 
Reporting Fraud to the SEC = 3.63, S.D. = 2.201. Both of these means are higher than the 
mean for a typical manager reporting financial reporting fraud to the SEC (mean = 4.01, 
p < 0.001 in both cases). 
 The mean of Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of Assets Anonymously = 
6.94, S.D. = 2.543, and the mean of Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of Assets to 
the Controller = 6.78, S.D. = 2.667, are not significantly different from each other (t-test 
for difference has p = 0.727). Both of these means are significantly higher than the mean 





test for difference has p < 0.001 in both cases). Inquiries related to the likelihood of a 
typical manager reporting fraud reflects that the mean of Likelihood Typical Manager 
Reports Misappropriation of Assets Anonymously = 6.15, S.D. = 2.032, which is higher 
than the mean of Likelihood Typical Manager Reports Misappropriation of Assets to the 
Controller = 5.60, S.D. = 2.336 (t-test for difference has p = 0.045). Both of these means 
are significantly higher than the mean of Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Misappropriation of Assets to the SEC = 2.94, S.D. = 1.851 (in both cases, the t-test for 
difference has a p < 0.001).  
Participants also responded to the personal cost questions regarding concerns 
about being considered a troublemaker by peers, being isolated by peers, and receiving 
the cold shoulder from peers if they reported fraudulent activities. The mean of Personal 
Cost Concern if You Report Financial Reporting Fraud Anonymously = 3.65, S.D. = 
2.496, the mean of Personal Cost Concern if You Report Financial Reporting Fraud to 
Controller = 4.99, S.D. = 2.583, and the mean of Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Financial Reporting Fraud to SEC = 6.09, S.D. = 2.856. Results reveal more concern 
about personal costs if financial reporting fraud was reported to the Controller than 
anonymously (t-test for difference has p < 0.001), and more concern if financial reporting 
fraud was reported to the SEC compared to reporting anonymously (t-test for difference 
has p < 0.001) or SEC compared to the Controller directly (t-test for difference has p < 
0.001). The results also reveal the participants have less concern about personal cost 
when reporting anonymously compared to the Controller when the fraud reporting relates 
to misappropriation of assets (mean of Personal Cost Concern if You Report 





Concern if You Report Misappropriation of Assets to Controller = 3.94, S.D. = 2.441, and 
t-tests for difference has p < 0.001). Both of these means are significantly lower than the 
mean of Personal Cost Concern if You Report Misappropriation of Assets to SEC = 5.30, 
S.D. = 2.983, t-test has p < 0.001 in both cases).  
One sample t-tests on the reporting likelihood difference between “You” and 
“Typical Manager” variables are run to see if the difference variables are statistically 
different from zero, and the results reveal significance (p < 0.05) for reporting Financial 
Reporting Fraud Anonymously, Financial Reporting Fraud to Controller, 
Misappropriation of Assets Anonymously, and Misappropriation of Assets to Controller 
(means = 0.58, 1.61, 0.79, and 1.18, respectively). The one sample t-tests on the reporting 
likelihood difference for reporting Financial Reporting Fraud to the SEC (mean = 0.39) 
and Misappropriation of Assets to the SEC (mean = -0.36) are marginally significant (p = 





Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables 
(n = 80) 
 Mean Std. Deviation (S.D.) 
You Report Financial Reporting Fraud:   
Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting 
Fraud Anonymously*  6.15
a 
2.491 
Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting 
Fraud to Controller* 6.45
a 
2.418 
Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting 
Fraud to SEC*  4.01
b 
2.457 
Typical Manager Reports Financial 
Reporting Fraud:   
Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 







Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Financial Reporting Fraud to Controller*  4.84
b 
2.230 
Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Financial Reporting Fraud to SEC*  3.63
b 
2.201 
Personal Cost Concern, Financial Reporting 
Fraud:   
Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Financial Reporting Fraud Anonymously**  3.65
b 
2.496 
Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Financial Reporting Fraud to Controller**  4.99
b 
2.583 
Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Financial Reporting Fraud to SEC**  6.09
b 
2.856 
You Report Misappropriation of Assets:   
Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of 
Assets Anonymously*  6.94
a 
2.543 
Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of 
Assets to Controller*  6.78
a 
2.667 
Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of 
Assets to SEC*  2.58
b 
1.895 
Typical Manager Reports Misappropriation 
of Assets:   
Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Misappropriation of Assets Anonymously*  6.15
b 
2.032 
Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Misappropriation of Assets to Controller*  5.60
b 
2.336 
Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Misappropriation of Assets to SEC*  2.94
b 
1.851 
Personal Cost Concern, Misappropriation of 
Assets:   
Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Misappropriation of Assets Anonymously**  2.93
b 
2.209 
Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Misappropriation of Assets to Controller**  3.94
b 
2.441 
Personal Cost Concern if You Report 
Misappropriation of Assets to SEC** 5.30
b 
2.983 
Difference between You and Typical 





Report Financial Reporting Fraud 
Anonymously: Likelihood Difference 
between You and Typical Manager .58 2.103 
Report Financial Reporting Fraud to 
Controller: Likelihood Difference between 
You and Typical Manager 1.61 2.538 
Report Financial Reporting Fraud to SEC: 
Likelihood Difference between You and 
Typical Manager .39 1.952 
Report Misappropriation of Assets 
Anonymously: Likelihood Difference 
between You and Typical Manager .79 2.519 
Report Misappropriation of Assets to 
Controller: Likelihood Difference between 
You and Typical Manager 1.18 2.407 
Report Misappropriation of Assets to SEC: 
Likelihood Difference between You and 
Typical Manager  -.36 1.723 
 
* Scale 1 = None, 9 = Extremely likely 
** Scale 1 = Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned 
a 
Mean is not significantly different from other means in this grouping that have this same coding (
a
) (not 
done in difference section). 
b 
Mean is significantly different from other means in this grouping (not done in difference section). 
 
Cell Sizes and Variable Definitions 
The cell sizes appear in Table 3 – Panel A and indicate that 22 participants are 
given the Transformational/Low Personal Cost treatment, 18 are given the 
Transformational/High Personal Cost treatment, 23 participants are given the 
Transactional/Low Personal Cost treatment, and 17 are given the Transactional/ High 












Leadership Style Total 
 Low Personal Cost 22 23 45 
High Personal Cost 18 17 35 
Total 40 40 80 
 
Table 3 – Panel B 
Variable Definitions 
 Variable Name Description 
Leadership Style Supervisor’s style is portrayed in the 
instrument as having attributes 
associated with Transformational 
Leadership style or Transactional 
Leadership Style; = 1 if 
Transformational, = 0 if Transactional 
Personal Cost Level of the participant’s risk of 
reprisal or sanctions being imposed by 
peers if participant reported fraud; = 1 
if high, = 0 if low 
Gender =1 if participant is female, = 0 if male 
Age Age of participant in years 
Public Company = 1 if participant works for a publicly 
traded company, 0 if not publicly 
traded  
Responsibility Participant’s level of responsibility for 
reporting fraudulent behavior (scale 




              I first ran MANCOVA models to examine the effects of Leadership Style, 
Personal Cost, and the interaction of Leadership Style and Personal Cost on intent to 
report financial reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets. Gender, Age, Public 





across fraud scenarios and all reporting channels available for both the participant and the 
participant’s perception of how a typical manager would report fraudulent behavior. 
Models that are significant or marginally significant are reported in Table 4. 
              The model reflected in Table 4 – Panel A is based on the six dependent variables 
reflected in the You Report Financial Reporting Fraud and the You Report 
Misappropriation of Assets groupings in Table 2 (i.e., report anonymously, to Controller, 
and to SEC).  The model in Table 4 – Panel A is significant (F = 1.50 and p = 0.030). The 
coefficient on Age is significant, p = 0.011, and the coefficient on Responsibility is 
marginally significant, p = 0.058.   
 The model based on the six dependent variables reflected in the Typical Manager 
Reports Financial Reporting Fraud and the Typical Manager Reports Misappropriation of 
Assets groupings in Table 2 (i.e., report anonymously, to Controller, and to SEC) are 
captured in Table 4 – Panel B. The Table 4 – Panel B model is significant (F = 1.43 and p 
= 0.046). The coefficients of Age and Responsibility are also significant or marginally 
significant (p = 0.004 and p = 0.089, respectively). 
             The reporting intentions of the participant based only on the financial reporting 
fraud scenario, considering all reporting channels available, is reported in Table 4 – Panel 
C (three variables for you report anonymously, to Controller, and to SEC). The model in 
Table 4 – Panel C is significant at p = 0.054 (F = 1.59). The coefficient on Gender 
(female) is marginally significant, p = 0.087, and the coefficient on Responsibility is 
significant, p = 0.015. I also ran a model of the reporting intentions of a typical manager 
based only on the financial reporting fraud scenario, considering all reporting channels, 





              The reporting intentions of the participant based only on the misappropriation of 
assets fraud scenario, considering all reporting channels available (three variables for 
report anonymously, to Controller, and to SEC), is reported in Table 4 – Panel D. The 
model in Table 4 – Panel D is marginally significant (F = 1.52 and p = 0.075). The 
coefficient on Age is significant, p = 0.001.   
 I also ran a model of the reporting intentions of a typical manager based only on 
the misappropriation of assets fraud scenario, considering all three reporting channels, 
and the model is reported in Table 4 – Panel E and is significant (F = 1.61 and p = 0.050). 
The coefficient on Age is also significant in this model, p = 0.027, and the coefficient on 
Leadership Style is marginally significant (p = 0.094). 
 Overall, the MANCOVA results in Panels A – E of Table 4 indicate that Age and 
Responsibility are most consistently related to reporting intentions. In addition, Gender is 
significant in one case, and Leadership Style is marginally significant in one instance.
10
 
 To gain more insight on reporting behavior, I also examined the personal cost 
concern of reporting fraud. I analyzed the concern of reporting financial reporting fraud 
and misappropriation of assets combined and then separately. The models for the 
combined fraud scenarios and financial reporting fraud separately are not significant. The 
model for personal cost concern of reporting misappropriation of assets is reported in 
Table 4 – Panel F and is significant (F = 1.65 and p = 0.042). The coefficient on Gender 
is marginally significant, p = 0.102, and the coefficient on Age is significant, p = 0.006. 
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 If I run the MANCOVAs on the full sample (n = 105, including those who failed a manipulation check), 





Table 4 – Panel A 
Model: Intent to Report (You Report Financial Reporting Fraud [3 Variables], You 
Report Misappropriation of Assets [3 Variables]) = f (Leadership Style, Personal 
Cost, Leadership Style X Personal Cost, Gender, Age, Public Company, 
Responsibility) 
(n = 80)  
Source  df F Sig. 
Model  7 1.50 0.030 
Leadership Style  1 0.70 0.647 
Personal Cost  1 0.93 0.481 
Leadership Style * Personal Cost  1 1.27 0.285 
Gender  1 1.13 0.357 
Age  1 3.02 0.011 
Public Company  1 1.28 0.276 
Responsibility 
Error 
 1 2.15 0.058 
 72   
 Total  80   
 Corrected Total  79   
 
Note: Wilks’ lambda results are reported in table. 
 
Table 4 – Panel B 
Model: Intent to Report (Typical Manager Reports Financial Reporting Fraud [3 
Variables], Typical Manager Reports Misappropriation of Assets [3 Variables]) = f 
(Leadership Style, Personal Cost, Leadership Style X Personal Cost, Gender, Age, 
Public Company, Responsibility) 
(n = 80) 
Source  df F Sig. 
Model  7 1.43 0.046 
Leadership Style  1 1.73 0.128 
Personal Cost  1 1.46 0.205 
Leadership Style * Personal Cost  1 1.05 0.403 
Gender  1 0.22 0.969 
Age  1 3.58 0.004 
Public Company  1 0.48 0.820 
Responsibility 
Error 
 1 1.93 0.089 
 72   
Total  80   






Table 4 – Panel C 
Model: Intent to Report (You Report Financial Reporting Fraud [3 Variables]) = f 
(Leadership Style, Personal Cost, Leadership Style X Personal Cost, Gender, Age, 
Public Company, Responsibility) 
(n = 80) 
Source  df F Sig. 
Model  7 1.59 0.054 
Leadership Style  1 0.82 0.488 
Personal Cost  1 0.30 0.824 
Leadership Style * Personal Cost  1 1.99 0.123 
Gender  1 2.28 0.087 
Age  1 0.25 0.858 
Public Company  1 1.70 0.175 
Responsibility 
Error 
 1 3.75 0.015 
 72   
 Total  80   
 Corrected Total  79   
 
Table 4 – Panel D 
Model: Intent to Report (You Report Misappropriation of Assets [3 Variables]) = f 
(Leadership Style, Personal Cost, Leadership Style X Personal Cost, Gender, Age, 
Public Company, Responsibility) 
(n = 80) 
Source  df F Sig. 
Model  7 1.52 0.075 
Leadership Style  1 0.31 0.819 
Personal Cost  1 1.44 0.237 
Leadership Style * Personal Cost  1 0.38 0.770 
Gender  1 1.08 0.364 
Age  1 5.83 0.001 
Public Company  1 1.09 0.361 
Responsibility 
Error 
 1 0.47 0.703 
 72   
 Total  80   






Table 4 – Panel E 
Model: Intent to Report (Typical Manager Reports Misappropriation of Assets [3 
Variables]) = f (Leadership Style, Personal Cost, Leadership Style X Personal 
Cost, Gender, Age, Public Company, Responsibility) 
(n = 80) 
Source  df F Sig. 
Model  7 1.61 0.050 
Leadership Style  1 2.22 0.094 
Personal Cost  1 1.46 0.232 
Leadership Style * Personal Cost  1 1.68 0.179 
Gender  1 0.28 0.842 
Age  1 3.24 0.027 
Public Company  1 0.70 0.553 
Responsibility 
Error 
 1 0.60 0.617 
 72   
 Total  80   
 Corrected Total  79   
 
Table 4 – Panel F 
Model: Personal Cost Concern Reporting Misappropriation of Assets [3 
Variables] = f (Leadership Style, Personal Cost, Leadership Style X Personal 
Cost, Gender, Age, Public Company, Responsibility) 
(n = 80) 
Source  df F Sig. 
Model  7 1.65 0.042 
Leadership Style  1 1.35 0.264 
Personal Cost  1 1.94 0.131 
Leadership Style * Personal Cost  1 0.98 0.409 
Gender  1 2.15 0.102 
Age  1 4.52 0.006 
Public Company  1 0.49 0.689 
Responsibility 
Error 
 1 1.37 0.258 
 72   
 Total  80   







Based on the MANCOVA results, I next ran ANCOVA models to further examine 
the effects of Leadership Style, Personal Cost, and the interaction of Leadership Style and 
Personal Cost on intent to report. Gender, Age, Public Company, and Responsibility are 
the control variables. I ran a total of 24 models based on the dependent variables reflected 
in Table 2. Only 10 of the ANCOVA models are marginally significant or significant, and 
these 10 models are presented in Tables 5 through 14.  The first subsection (Tables 5 
through 9) relates to the hypothesized dependent variables, the second subsection (Tables 
10 and 11) examines personal cost concern to obtain additional insight on reporting 
behavior, and the third subsection (Tables 12 through 14) focuses on social desirability 
bias results.  
Hypothesized Dependent Variable Results 
The model in Table 5 uses the Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting Fraud 
Anonymously as the dependent variable. The model is marginally significant (F = 1.795 
and p = 0.101). The coefficient on Gender is significant, p = 0.030, and the coefficient on 
Responsibility is significant, p = 0.022.
11
 These results indicate that female participants 
and the level of responsibility the participant perceives they have for reporting fraudulent 
behavior are positively related to the likelihood of reporting financial reporting fraud 
anonymously. The mean of Likelihood to Report Financial Reporting Fraud 
Anonymously was 7.15 (S.D. = 2.29) for females, versus a mean of 5.67 (S.D. = 2.46) for 
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DV = Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting Fraud Anonymously  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 10.406 1.795 .101 
Intercept 1 9.189 1.585 .212 
Leadership Style 1 .748 .129 .720 
Personal Cost 1 .138 .024 .878 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 .242 .042 .839 
Gender 1 28.305 4.883 .030 
Age 1 3.241 .559 .457 
Public Company 1 .743 .128 .721 
Responsibility 1 31.809 5.488 .022 
Error 72 5.797   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
R Squared = .149 (Adjusted R Squared = .066) 
 
Table 6 uses the Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting Fraud to the 
Controller as the dependent variable. The model is significant (F = 2.318 and p = 0.034). 
The interaction between Leadership Style and Personal Cost is significant (p = 0.017). 
The results for the treatments with the low personal cost environment indicate that 
participants in the transactional leader environment have a mean of 5.87 (S.D. = 2.51), 
and participants in the transformational leader environment have a mean of 7.14 (S.D. = 
2.08). When personal costs are high, participants in the transactional leader environment 
have a mean of 7.18 (S.D. = 1.85) and participants in the transformational leader 
environment have a mean of 5.67 (S.D. = 2.87). Therefore, transformational leadership 
does not have a greater effect on likelihood to blow the whistle when personal costs are 





The coefficients on Gender and Public Company are significant or marginally 
significant (p = 0.091 and p = 0.027, respectively). The likelihood to report financial 
reporting fraud to the Controller for male participants has a mean of 6.69 (S.D. = 2.35), 
and for female participants the mean is only 5.96 (S.D. = 2.52). This gender result is 
opposite of the results in Table 5 and may suggest that females are more comfortable 
reporting anonymously, but less comfortable reporting to the Controller. The mean for 
participants working for a public company is 5.74 (S.D. = 2.60), and for participants 
working for a nonpublic company the mean is 6.81 (S.D. = 2.26). Thus, public company 
participants appear less likely to report to the Controller. Finally, note that I find evidence 
of heteroskedasticity in the model, and the model is not significant (p = 0.106) if I use 




DV = Likelihood You Report Financial Reporting Fraud to Controller  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 12.131 2.318 .034* 
Intercept 1 33.842 6.465 .013 
Leadership Style 1 5.059 .966 .329 
Personal Cost 1 .601 .115 .736 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 31.137 5.948 .017 
Gender 1 15.378 2.938 .091 
Age 1 .001 .000 .991 
Public Company 1 26.778 5.116 .027 
Responsibility 1 8.869 1.694 .197 
Error 72 5.234   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
R Squared = .184 (Adjusted R Squared = .105) 





using regression and robust standard errors, the model has p = 0.106, Gender has p = 0.106, and Public 
Company has p = 0.066.  
 
The Likelihood Typical Manager Reports Financial Reporting Fraud to the SEC is 
the dependent variable in the model presented in Table 7. The model is marginally 
significant (F = 1.876 and p = 0.086). The coefficients on Age (p = 0.087) and 
Responsibility (p = 0.006) are marginally significant and significant, respectively. Age is 
negatively correlated and level of responsibility assumed for reporting the wrongdoings is 




DV = Likelihood Typical Manager Reports Financial Reporting Fraud to SEC  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 8.433 1.876 .086 
Intercept 1 2.387 .531 .469 
Leadership Style 1 6.554 1.458 .231 
Personal Cost 1 .425 .094 .760 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 7.043 1.567 .215 
Gender 1 1.144 .254 .615 
Age 1 13.506 3.004 .087 
Public Company 1 .048 .011 .918 
Responsibility 1 35.534 7.903 .006 
Error 72 4.496   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
R Squared = .154 (Adjusted R Squared = .072) 
 
 
Age also has an influence on the Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of 





2.126 and p = 0.051), and the Age control variable is significant (p = 0.002) and has a 




DV = Likelihood You Report Misappropriation of Assets to Controller  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 13.750 2.126 .051* 
Intercept 1 20.749 3.208 .077 
Leadership Style 1 .405 .063 .803 
Personal Cost 1 9.807 1.516 .222 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 .017 .003 .959 
Gender 1 11.900 1.840 .179 
Age 1 66.781 10.325 .002 
Public Company 1 11.525 1.782 .186 
Responsibility 1 2.506 .387 .536 
Error 72 6.468   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
R Squared = .171 (Adjusted R Squared = .091) 
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity: Prob > chi2 = 0.0465. If I run the model using 
regression and robust standard errors, the results are similar. 
  
The model presented in Table 9 reflects the Likelihood Typical Manager Reports 
Misappropriation of Assets to the SEC is significant (F = 2.297 and p = 0.036). The 
leadership style of the manager (p = 0.083) and the interaction of the leadership style and 
risk of reprisal (p = 0.064) are marginally significant. In this model, participants indicate 
that a typical manager is more likely to report misappropriation of assets in the 
transformational leader (mean of 3.25, S.D. = 2.01) environment than in the transactional 





The results for the treatments with the low personal cost environment indicate that 
participants think a typical manager in the transactional leader environment (mean of 
2.61, S.D. = 1.67) and a typical manager in the transformational leader environment 
(mean of 2.55, S.D. = 1.44) have a low likelihood to report fraud. However, when 
personal costs are high, participants think a typical manager in the transformational 
leader environment is likely to report misappropriation of assets to the SEC (mean of 
4.11, S.D. = 2.30) and a typical manager in the transactional leader environment has a 
low likelihood to report to the SEC (mean of 2.65, S.D. = 1.66). Therefore, employing the 
option to report externally to the SEC, transformational leadership does appear to have a 
greater effect on the likelihood of a typical manager to blow the whistle when personal 
costs are high. This finding is qualitatively consistent with H2, although the greater 
intention to report when personal costs are high is unexpected. 
The Age (p = 0.064) of the participant also is marginally significant. Older 
















DV = Likelihood Typical Manager Reports Misappropriation of Assets to SEC  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 7.059 2.297 .036* 
Intercept 1 15.883 5.168 .026 
Leadership Style 1 9.526 3.100 .083 
Personal Cost 1 5.481 1.783 .186 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 10.906 3.549 .064 
Gender 1 .580 .189 .665 
Age 1 10.914 3.551 .064 
Public Company 1 4.022 1.309 .256 
Responsibility 1 2.962 .964 .330 
Error 72 3.073   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
R Squared = .183 (Adjusted R Squared = .103) 
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity: Prob > chi2 = 0.0300. If I run the model using 
regression and robust standard errors, the model has p = 0.084, and Leadership Style has p = 0.113 (two-
tailed). 
 
Personal Cost Concern Results 
To gain more insight on reporting behavior (how concerns about personal costs 
are affected by the independent variables), this study also examines the level of concern 
participants have regarding being viewed as a troublemaker, being isolated by their peers, 
and receiving the cold shoulder if they reported fraudulent behavior. Table 10 presents the 
model of Personal Cost Concern if You Report Misappropriation of Assets to Controller, 
and it is significant (F = 2.107 and p = 0.053). Leadership style is marginally significant 
(p = 0.084). The participants in this model are more likely to be concerned about 
reporting misappropriation of assets to the Controller in the transformational leader 





environment (mean of 3.68, S.D. = 2.30). The level of responsibility to report is 
marginally significant (p = 0.075) and is negatively correlated with concern. Gender is 
also marginally significant in this model (p = 0.088). Female participants (mean of 4.42, 
S.D. = 2.52) are more likely to be concerned about reporting misappropriation of assets to 


















DV = Personal Cost Concern if You Report Misappropriation of Assets to Controller  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 11.434 2.107 .053 
Intercept 1 93.217 17.180 .000 
Leadership Style 1 16.693 3.077 .084 
Personal Cost 1 .579 .107 .745 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 7.686 1.417 .238 
Gender 1 16.196 2.985 .088 
Age 1 13.117 2.418 .124 
Public Company 1 6.594 1.215 .274 
Responsibility 1 17.692 3.261 .075 
Error 72 5.426   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
R Squared = .170 (Adjusted R Squared = .089) 
 
 
Table 11 captures Personal Cost Concern if You Report Misappropriation of 
Assets to SEC, and this full model is marginally significant at the 0.102 level (F = 1.793). 
Age is significant (p = 0.016) and is negatively correlated with concern, which indicates 



















DV = Personal Cost Concern if You Report Misappropriation of Assets to SEC  
(n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 14.904 1.793 .102 
Intercept 1 146.479 17.622 .000 
Leadership Style 1 3.181 .383 .538 
Personal Cost 1 18.453 2.220 .141 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 14.922 1.795 .184 
Gender 1 15.561 1.872 .175 
Age 1 50.680 6.097 .016 
Public Company 1 .406 .049 .826 
Responsibility 1 1.951 .235 .630 
Error 72 8.312   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
a. R Squared = .148 (Adjusted R Squared = .066) 
 
Social Desirability Bias Results 
Tables 12, 13, and 14 reflect models associated with the reporting differences 
between the participant and their perceptions of the reporting intent of a typical manager. 
Table 12 captures the difference between the participants and their thoughts on a typical 
manager reporting financial reporting fraud anonymously. The model in Table 12 is 
significant (F = 2.111 and p = 0.053). Personal cost is significant in this model (p = 
0.040). The mean for the high personal cost environment is 0.97 (S.D. = 2.01) compared 
to the mean of 0.27 (S.D. = 2.15) for the low personal cost environment. These results 
suggest there is a larger difference in reporting intentions (you versus typical manager) 
when there is a high personal cost environment. Gender is marginally significant (p = 





(mean of 1.15, S.D. = 1.71) than for Males (mean of 0.30, S.D. = 2.23). The coefficient 
on Responsibility is marginally significant (p = 0.101) and has a positive correlation with 
the dependent variable, indicating that participants assuming more responsibility for 
reporting have greater gaps between their reporting intentions and those of a typical 
manager. Finally, note that I find evidence of heteroskedasticity in the model, and the 
model is not significant (p = 0.179) if I use regression and robust standard errors (see 
bottom of table). 
Table 12 
ANCOVA Results: 
DV = Report Financial Reporting Fraud Anonymously:  
Likelihood Difference between You and Typical Manager 
 (n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 8.502 2.111 .053* 
Intercept 1 18.392 4.566 .036 
Leadership Style 1 .721 .179 .674 
Personal Cost 1 17.615 4.373 .040 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 3.053 .758 .387 
Gender 1 15.622 3.878 .053 
Age 1 8.474 2.104 .151 
Public Company 1 .857 .213 .646 
Responsibility 1 11.108 2.758 .101 
Error 72 4.028   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity: Prob > chi2 = 0.0493. If I run the model using 
regression and robust standard errors, the model is not significant (p = 0.179). 
  
Table 13 reflects the difference between the participants and their perceptions of 
the reporting intentions of a typical manager to report financial reporting fraud to the 





interaction of Leadership Style and Personal Cost is significant (p = 0.039). The highest 
cell means are for transactional leadership / high cost (mean of 2.65, S.D. = 1.37) and 
transformational leadership / low cost (mean of 1.91, S.D. = 2.11). The other two cell 
means are approximately 1.00. Finally, note that I find evidence of heteroskedasticity in 
the model, and the model is not significant (p = 0.109) if I use regression and robust 
standard errors (see bottom of table). 
Table 13 
ANCOVA Results: 
DV = Report Financial Reporting Fraud to Controller: 
 Likelihood Difference between You and Typical Manager 
 (n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 11.086 1.850 .091* 
Intercept 1 .638 .106 .745 
Leadership Style 1 7.297 1.218 .273 
Personal Cost 1 4.089 .682 .411 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 26.382 4.403 .039 
Gender 1 16.132 2.693 .105 
Age 1 13.120 2.190 .143 
Public Company 1 14.204 2.371 .128 
Responsibility 1 .344 .057 .811 
Error 72 5.991   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
 
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity: Prob > chi2 = 0.0021. If I run the model using 
regression and robust standard errors, the model has p = 0.109, and the interaction term has p = 0.048. 
 
The likelihood difference in reporting misappropriation of assets anonymously is 
presented in Table 14. This model is marginally significant (F = 1.820 and p = 0.096). 
Personal cost is the only significant predictor in this model (p = 0.034). The high 
Personal Cost environment has a mean of 1.51 (S.D. = 2.11) compared to the low 





that the participants are relatively more likely than typical managers to report 




DV = Report Misappropriation of Assets Anonymously:  
Likelihood Difference between You and Typical Manager 
 (n = 80) 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 7 10.769 1.820 .096 
Intercept 1 .783 .132 .717 
Leadership Style 1 13.577 2.295 .134 
Personal Cost 1 27.504 4.649 .034 
Leadership Style * Personal 
Cost 
1 1.200 .203 .654 
Gender 1 12.642 2.137 .148 
Age 1 7.216 1.220 .273 
Public Company 1 1.149 .194 .661 
Responsibility 1 3.840 .649 .423 
Error 72 5.917   
Total 80    
Corrected Total 79    
  
As reflected in Table 2, this study includes 12 models that are focused on the 
likelihood of the participant or a typical manager reporting fraudulent behavior as the 
dependent variable. The five of these 12 models that are marginally significant or 
significant are presented in Tables 5 through 9. H1 is supported only in the model 
reflected in Table 9. Since Transformational Leadership Style does not have a significant 
influence on intent to whistleblow in most of the models examined in this study, the 
mediation of trust and the mediation value congruence as reflected in H3a and H3b are 







The models in Tables 5 and 6 reflect scenarios in which the participant is 
reporting financial reporting fraud. The models in Tables 8 and 9 relate to reporting 
misappropriation of assets. In response to the fraud type research question presented in 
this study, the results do not provide a clear indicator whether the effects of leadership 





CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
Using an experimental approach, this study examines employees’ intention to 
report occupational fraud through various channels based on the leadership style 
(transformational or transactional) of the manager and the expected personal costs (either 
high or low) of reporting, as well as four control variables (Gender, Age, Public 
Company, and Responsibility). While the MANCOVA results point primarily to Age and 
Responsibility as being associated with intent to report, some other results emerge in the 
individual ANCOVAs. 
The results of the present study provide a contribution to researchers, managers, 
and auditors. First, the current study responds to the call for additional research on the 
role of management in the whistleblowing process (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011). 
The findings of the study extend our understanding of the role leadership style 
(transformational and transactional), personal cost (high and low), and the interaction of 
leadership style and personal cost has on employees’ whistleblowing intent. Leadership 
Style and Personal Cost variables do not have a significant influence on reporting 
intentions in the vast majority of the models presented in this study. In certain conditions, 
I find that the intent to report fraud internally is more likely when there is a transactional 
leader and the personal costs are high (Table 6), and are more likely under a 
transformational leader when the personal costs are low. However, the intent of a typical 
manager to report fraud externally is more likely to occur under a transformational leader 
in a high (Table 9) personal cost environment.  
Second, the current study also expands the literature by attempting to explore the 





assets and fraudulent financial reporting). The results of my study are 
inconclusive. However, the descriptive statistics indicate that participants are more likely 
to report financial reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets internally than 
externally report to the SEC and participants think a typical manager is more likely to 
report financial reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets internally than externally 
report to the SEC.  
Third, the results indicate that Gender plays a significant role in reporting 
intentions (Tables 5, 6, and 10). I find that females are more concerned about personal 
cost when reporting misappropriation of assets internally to the Controller. The likelihood 
of reporting financial reporting fraud to the Controller is higher for males. I also find that 
age positively influences the participants’ intent to report fraud internally (Table 8), 
negatively influences the participants’ intent to report fraud externally (Table11), and 
negatively influences a typical manager’s intent to report fraud externally (Tables 7 and 
9).  
There are limitations in my study. The use of an experimental approach with a 
hypothetical situation is not the same as an employee responding to an actual fraudulent 
event in the workplace. However, the use of an experimental research design to examine 
intent to report wrongful acts has been used in previous research (Kaplan, 1995; Ayers & 
Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2009; Kaplan et al., 2010, 2011). A 
second limitation is the use of Executive/Professional MBA students as participants. 
Although MBA students have been used in previous research (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; 
Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Kaplan et al., 2010, 2011), the use of student participants is not 





with finding individuals willing to respond to inquiries regarding an actual fraud case or 
an actual act of whistleblowing, examining whistleblowing intent using a hypothetical 
case provides the information needed to complete this study.  
A third limitation is that the study uses a speech to convey the leadership style 
environment and background information is used to describe the personal cost 
environment. Although the participants in the study do not the benefit of having firsthand 
experience of leadership style and personal cost culture, the manipulation check pass rate 
of 77.1% indicates that the written speech and background information were sufficient to 
capture the leadership style and personal cost environment needed to conduct this study.  
A fourth limitation relates to the use of only one scenario for each of the two types 
of fraudulent acts included in this study. An attempt was made to provide fraud cases that 
were descriptive enough to understand the nature of the fraud. However, the participants’ 
responses are reactions to the limited information provided in each scenario. Since the 
fraud scenarios represent typical and somewhat common fraudulent acts, the 
generalizability of the findings is not a concern. 
Finally, as noted in the tables, I find evidence of heteroskedasticity in certain 
models. In such cases, I present the effect on the results if I use regression with robust 
standard errors. Some results are negatively impacted (in particular, see Tables 6, 12, and 
13, where the overall models are not significant using this alternate approach). Other 
remedies, such as ANCOVA on ranks, do not appear to be well suited to this study, in 
which the dependent variables are Likert scale values. 
The results of the majority of the models analyzed in this study do not indicate 





Additional research is needed to explore the role of management and personal cost in the 
whistleblowing process. An exploratory approach in my study identified age and gender 
as covariates, and the coefficient on at least one of these variables is marginally or 
significantly significant in eight out of the 10 models included in my analysis. Future 
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Employee Whistleblowing  
 
 
This study is part of my research requirement to earn my Doctorate in Business 
Administration (DBA) at Kennesaw State University. The purpose of the study is to gain 
insight into employee whistleblowing intent.  
 
Your position and expertise make your opinions and evaluations very important to this 
study. We will be happy to make a contribution to the charity of your choice in 
appreciation for your participation. The study consists of a hypothetical case and follow-
up questions. The estimated time for completion is approximately 25 minutes.  
 
Your participation in the study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent 
(or skip a question) at any time without penalty. Additionally, your individual results will 
be anonymous (all data will be reported in the aggregate only). There are no known risks 
involved due to participation in this study. You must be at least 18 years of age to 
participate in this study.  
 
If you have any questions about the study you can contact me using the information 
below. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried 
out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems 
regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, 
Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, 
(678) 797-2268. 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and assistance. Your response is greatly appreciated. 
 














1. The pages that follow contain a hypothetical case that includes summary background 
information and questions for you to answer.  
 
2. It is critical that you attempt to put yourself in the following situation as the company’s 
Finance Manager and answer all of the questions as candidly as possible without 
consulting anyone else.  
 
3. Please complete the materials/pages in the order given without looking ahead through 
the pages. There are no right or wrong answers, so please answer the questions in a 
way that reflects your honest opinions and judgments. To ensure a usable response, 
please complete all of the questions if possible. You will have an opportunity at the 
end of the case to provide any clarifications or comments you would like to make.  
 
4. Your responses are guaranteed anonymity. No effort will be made to link you to your 
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Please assume you are employed as the Finance Manager of Global Manufacturing, Inc. 
(Global). The Finance Manager is responsible for financial planning and analyzing the 
financial results of the company. Global is a publicly-traded company that is a supplier to 
industrial and commercial facilities worldwide. Global specializes in repairs and 
maintenance materials and supplies. Global’s product offerings are high quality, and the 
company is known for quick delivery and excellent customer service. Global has regional 
distribution centers across the United States.  
 
















The Controller, Terry Jones, is responsible for overseeing and directing all of the 
accounting and finance functions of Global, and you report directly to Terry. You and the 
four other managers who report to Terry each oversee specific elements of the accounting 
and finance function. 
 
At a recent staff meeting, the Controller, Terry Jones, spoke to the staff and said the 
following: 
 
[Transformational Leader condition]  
 
Global has a reputation for quick delivery of high quality products. The strength of the 
company is based on its greatest asset, its people. I am proud to lead this team, and I 
thank everyone for your hard work, for your contribution to our overall success, and for 
working collectively towards achieving our shared mission.  
 
It is important that we understand that our team’s purpose in the organization is to 























decisions. I’m excited and optimistic that our team will continue to achieve our goals, 
delivering a high level of customer service and technical expertise that our customers, 
both internal and external, deserve and respect. I’m interested and invested in staying 
focused on enhancing your individual strengths, ensuring your individual development, 
and teaching and coaching you for individual success, and our success as a team. 
 
If you need me for anything, you know I have an open door policy. I will rearrange my 
schedule if necessary, and I will offer relevant, practical, and constructive suggestions 
and new ideas to help you with your individual work assignments. I know each of you has 
individual needs, questions or concerns, and I encourage you to come speak with me 
anytime or directly after the meeting. 
 
[Transactional Leader condition] 
  
Global has a reputation for quick delivery of high quality products. The strength of the 
company is based on its ability to achieve results. I commend everyone who has met his 
or her performance goals and expectations for the year. 
 
It is important that we meet our performance goals in order that we can receive the 
bonuses budgeted for the members of our team. I’m tracking all of our team performance 
and customer service complaints to assess whether we are meeting our performance 
standards and are delivering a high level of customer service and technical expertise to 
our customers, both internal and external. I’m interested in everyone staying focused on 
your respective tasks, prioritizing and only solving the problems that are chronic and 
have high visibility, and not spending time trying to improve processes that appear to be 
working just fine as is. 
 
If you need me to help you solve more severe issues, I suggest you try to book a meeting 
with me because I’m typically travelling for business and my calendar is often full. I want 
you to send your critical questions or concerns to my assistant, and I will touch base to 
make an appointment to speak with you when I have time available. 
 
 
Additional Background  
 
Global has a widely communicated whistleblower policy that has been in place for 
several years. Throughout the year, employees are reminded that the whistleblower policy 
exists and that an anonymous reporting hotline is available. Company protocol also 
indicates that an employee has the option of reporting wrongdoing directly to the senior 
leader of his/her functional department.  
 
Items reported through the anonymous reporting hotline are managed by Global’s 
Internal Audit Department. It is standard practice for the Internal Audit Department to 
work directly with the senior leader of each functional department in Global to 
investigate and resolve whistleblower reports in their respective functional area. The 







At Global, individuals suspected of whistleblowing typically are not considered 
troublemakers by their peers, are not isolated by their peers, and do not receive the cold 
shoulder from their peers. 
 
High Cost: 
At Global, individuals suspected of whistleblowing often are considered troublemakers 
by their peers, are isolated by their peers, and receive the cold shoulder from their peers. 
 
Situations to Evaluate  
 
Please consider the two independent situations presented on the following pages and 







Situation 1: (Please provide your responses to situation 1 independent of your 
responses to situation 2) 
 
You are the Finance Manager. You discover that the Financial Reporting Manager appears 
to be inflating the company’s sales by changing the dates on invoices and shipping 
documents – to move the sales into the current period. You suspect that the apparent 
premature recording of sales is related to the rumors the Board may sell the company, and 
higher sales volume in the current period will make the company more attractive to 
potential buyers.  
 
Please answer the following questions based on the information in the case above 
(situation 1). You may refer back to the case information when responding. Indicate your 
answer by filling in a circle. 
 
1a. If you were facing this situation, what is the likelihood that YOU would report it 








         
 
1b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
2a. If you were facing this situation, what is the likelihood that YOU would report it 
to your company’s Controller, Terry Jones? (1 = None, 9 = Extremely likely) 
 
None 




         
 
2b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              







3a. If you were facing this situation, what is the likelihood that YOU would report it 
externally to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Office of the 
Whistleblower? (1 = None, 9 = Extremely likely) 
 
None 




         
 
3b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
4a. Based on the information presented above, what is the likelihood that A 
TYPICAL MANAGER in this office who has become aware of this situation 
would report it to the company’s anonymous reporting hotline? (1= None, 9 = 
Extremely likely)  
            
 
None 




         
 
4b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
5a. Based on the information presented above, what is the likelihood that A 
TYPICAL MANAGER in this office who has become aware of this situation 
would report it to the company’s Controller, Terry Jones? (1 = None, 9 = 
Extremely likely)  
            
 
None 




         
 
5b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              







6a. Based on the information presented above, what is the likelihood that A 
TYPICAL MANAGER in this office who has become aware of this situation 
would report it externally to the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower? (1 = None, 
9 = Extremely likely) 
 
None 




         
 
6b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
7. If YOU reported this behavior to the anonymous reporting hotline, how 
concerned would you be about being considered a troublemaker by your peers, 
being isolated by your peers, and receiving the cold shoulder from your peers? (1 
= Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned) 
 
Not at all 
concerned 




         
 
8. If YOU reported this behavior your company’s Controller, Terry Jones, how 
concerned would you be about being considered a troublemaker by your peers, 
being isolated by your peers, and receiving the cold shoulder from your peers? (1 
= Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned) 
 
Not at all 
concerned 




         
 
9. If YOU reported this behavior externally to the SEC’s Office of the 
Whistleblower, how concerned would you be about being considered a 
troublemaker by your peers, being isolated by your peers, and receiving the cold 
shoulder from your peers? (1 = Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned) 
 
Not at all 
concerned 











Situation 2: (Please provide your responses to situation 2 independent of your 
responses to situation 1) 
 
You are the Finance Manager. While analyzing recent increases in the company’s 
facilities expenses, you determine that, in several instances, it appears that the company is 
being billed by more than one cleaning service for cleaning the same office location. You 
discover that one of the cleaning companies submitting bills is actually a local family-
owned business run by the spouse of the Accounts Payable Manager. You suspect that the 
Accounts Payable Manager is submitting fictitious invoices and processing payments to 
the family’s cleaning service. 
 
Please answer the following questions based on the information in the case above 
(situation 2). You may refer back to the case information when responding. Indicate your 
answer by filling in a circle. 
 
1a. If you were facing this situation, what is the likelihood that YOU would report it 








         
 
1b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
2a. If you were facing this situation, what is the likelihood that YOU would report it 
to your company’s Controller, Terry Jones? (1 = None, 9 = Extremely likely) 
 
None 




         
 
2b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              










3a. If you were facing this situation, what is the likelihood that YOU would report it 
externally to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Office of the 
Whistleblower? (1 = None, 9 = Extremely likely) 
 
None 




         
 
3b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
4a. Based on the information presented above, what is the likelihood that A 
TYPICAL MANAGER in this office who has become aware of this situation 








         
 
4b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
5a. Based on the information presented above, what is the likelihood that A 
TYPICAL MANAGER in this office who has become aware of this situation 








         
 
5b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              






6a. Based on the information presented above, what is the likelihood that A 
TYPICAL MANAGER in this office who has become aware of this situation 
would report it externally to the SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower? (1 = None, 
9 = Extremely likely) 
 
None 




         
 
6b.  Please explain your rationale for the answer above. 
 
              
              
            
 
7. If YOU reported this behavior to the anonymous reporting hotline, how 
concerned would you be about being considered a troublemaker by your peers, 
being isolated by your peers, and receiving the cold shoulder from your peers? (1 
= Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned) 
 
Not at all 
concerned 




         
 
8. If YOU reported this behavior your company’s Controller, Terry Jones, how 
concerned would you be about being considered a troublemaker by your peers, 
being isolated by your peers, and receiving the cold shoulder from your peers? (1 
= Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned) 
 
Not at all 
concerned 




         
 
9. If YOU reported this behavior externally to the SEC’s Office of the 
Whistleblower, how concerned would you be about being considered a 
troublemaker by your peers, being isolated by your peers, and receiving the cold 
shoulder from your peers? (1 = Not at all concerned, 9 = Extremely concerned) 
    
 
Not at all 
concerned 











Please answer the following questions based on your perceptions of Terry Jones, 
Controller, after reading the case. You may refer back to the case information when 
responding. (0 = Not at all; 1 = Once in a while; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = Fairly often; 4 = 
Frequently, if not always)  
 





Please answer the following questions based on your perceptions of Terry Jones, 











 0 1 2 3 4 
Is absent when needed      
Talks optimistically about the future       
Focuses attention on irregularities, mistakes, 
exceptions, and deviations from standards       
Specifies the importance of having a strong 
sense of purpose       
Spends time teaching and coaching       
Makes clear what one can expect to receive 
when performance goals are achieved      
Shows that he/she is a firm believer in “If it 
ain’t broke, don’t fix it”       
Goes beyond self-interest for the good of the 
group       
Instills pride in me for being associated with 
him/her       
Treats me as an individual rather than just a 
member of a group       
Demonstrates that problems must become 
chronic before taking action       
Keeps track of all mistakes       
Gets me to look at problems from many 
different angles       
Suggests new ways of looking at how to 
complete assignments       
Emphasizes the importance of having a 
collective sense of mission      
Expresses satisfaction when I meet 
expectations      
Talks enthusiastically about what needs to be 
accomplished      





responding. Indicate your answer by filling in a circle. (1= Strongly disagree, 5 = 
Strongly agree) 
 














     
 














     
 














     
 














     
 














     
 
6. There is a great deal of agreement at my level about what the core values of my 






















Please answer the following questions without referring back to the case materials. 
Indicate your answer by filling in a circle. 
 
1.  How realistic do you find this case? (1= Not at all realistic, 5 = Very realistic) 
 












     
 
2.  How understandable do you find this case? (1= Not at all understandable, 5 = 
Very understandable) 
 












     
 
3.  How much responsibility do you think you have for reporting fraudulent 














     
 
4. Did you feel differently about the acts in situation 1 versus situation 2? If yes, 
please explain. 
 
              
              
            
 
For the next question, please select one response based on your understanding of the case, 
without referring back to the case materials. 
 
1. The facts of this case stated that at Global, individuals suspected of 
whistleblowing (check the appropriate choice): 
 
___ Often are considered troublemakers by their peers, are isolated by their peers, 
and receive the cold shoulder from their peers. 
___ Typically are not considered troublemakers by their peers, are not isolated by 





Please respond to the following demographic questions. These will be used only to 
analyze the results, not to identify any participant. 
 
1. What is your highest educational degree earned (check only one)?  
___ Bachelors  
___ Masters (please specify type)          
___ JD  
___ PhD/DBA 
___ Other (please describe) _____________________________________ 
 
2. Please indicate any programs in which you are currently enrolled (check one 
below)   
___ Currently Enrolled in MBA Program  
___ Currently Enrolled in EMBA program 
 
3. Please indicate any professional certifications you have._____________ 
 
4. Please provide your total years of professional business experience. ____ years 
 
5. What is your age? _______years 
 
6. What is your gender? ____________ 
 
If working full-time now, answer questions 7 through 12 
 
7. What position or title do you hold in your organization? 
______________________ 
 
8. What is the functional area of your department?  
___ Accounting/Finance 
___ Sales/Marketing   
___ Human Resources  
___ IT  
___ Other (please describe) _____________________________________ 
 
9. How much experience do you have in your current position? ________years 
 
10. Please indicate the primary industry in which your company operates _______ 
 
11. Please indicate your company’s approximate annual revenue $_______________ 
 
12. Is this company publicly-traded? ____________ 
 
If not working full-time now, answer questions 13 through 18 
 












14. What was the functional area of your former department?  
___ Accounting/Finance 
___ Sales/Marketing   
___ Human Resources  
___ IT  
___ Other 
 
15. How much experience did you have in your former position? ________years 
 




17. Please indicate your former company’s approximate annual revenue $__________ 
 
18. Is this company publicly-traded? ____________ 
 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
As a token of appreciation, we will make a contribution to the charity of your choice 
from the list below. Please indicate your preference below: 
 
____ American Cancer Society 
____ American Diabetes Association 
____ American Heart Association 
____ Girl Scouts of America 
____ Boys and Girls Club 
____ Habitat for Humanity 
 














Appendix B – Cover letter for Instrument mailed to UGA students 
October 31, 2014 
Hello! 
My name is Tonya Smalls.  I’m an Accounting doctoral student at Kennesaw State University, 
and I’m currently working on my dissertation. The purpose of the study is to gain insight into 
employee whistleblowing, and I need Executive/Professional MBA students to participant in my 
study.  
 I recently had the opportunity to meet some of the UGA EMBA and PMBA students that attend 
class at the Buckhead Campus.  I was onsite asking individuals to volunteer as one of my 
dissertation survey participants.  Due to time constraints, only a few students had time to 
complete the survey onsite (before or after class).  To obtain more participants, I inquired about 
alternate ways to distribute the survey to UGA students at the Buckhead Campus and the 
Gwinnett Campus.  As a result, the UGA MBA Programs office has assisted me by labeling (note: 
your address was not provided to me) and sending my survey packet directly to you via mail.  
Once I received the approval that allowed my survey to be distributed via mail, I was more than 
happy to incur the expense for the postage on the packet and the self-addressed return 
envelope enclosed in this packet!  I’m excited that the EMBA/PMBA students at UGA have 
another opportunity to be included in my study.  I realize how busy you are (I’m pursuing my 
doctorate while working full-time, and I was working full-time when I obtained my EMBA in 
2005).  I would greatly appreciate you spending approximately 25 minutes to complete the 
survey.  
Please return your completed survey in the postage paid self-addressed envelope that has been 
provided. The survey is anonymous. So, please do not include your name/address on the 
envelope when you return the survey to me.  Please return the completed survey to me by 
November 15, 2014, if feasible.    
Note: If you are one of the few individuals that have already completed the survey onsite at the 
Buckhead Campus, thank you again for your assistance. There is no need for you to complete 
the survey again. Please return the blank survey to me in the enclosed postage paid self-
addressed envelope by November 15, 2014.  
 
Thank you, 









Appendix C – Staff meeting speech by Terry Jones - Controller 
 
Staff Meeting Speech by Terry Jones – Controller: Recap of Transformational and 
Transactional language: 
 
The 4 categories of questions for Transformational Leadership style are 
1) Idealized Influence – Attributed (2 MLQ items: lines 3 and 7) 
Idealized Influence – Behavior (2 MLQ items: lines 3 and 4) 
2) Inspirational Motivation (2 MLQ items: line 5) 
3) Intellectual Stimulation (2 MLQ items: line 7) 
4) Individualized Consideration (2 MLQ items: lines 6 and 8)   
Total of 10 transformational items to reflect the 4 areas. 
 
The 3 categories of questions for Transactional Leadership style are 
1) Contingent Reward (2 MLQ items: lines 3 and 4) 
2) Management by Exception – Active (2 MLQ items: line 5) 
Management by Exception – Passive (2 MLQ items: line 6) 
3) Laissez- faire (2 MLQ items: lines 7 and 8) 
Total of 8 transactional items to reflect the 3 areas. 
 
 
Sentence Transformational  Transactional Comment, including 
any linkage to prior 
research 
1 Global has a reputation 
for quick delivery of 
high quality products. 
Global has a reputation 
for quick delivery of high 
quality products. 
Identical 
2 The strength of the 
company is based on its 
greatest asset, its people. 
The strength of the 
company is based on its 







oriented (Bass & 
Riggio, 2006) 





team, and I thank 
everyone for your hard 
work, for your 
contribution to our 
overall success, and for 
working collectively 
towards achieving our 
shared mission.  
who has met his or her 
performance goals and 




importance of having 





Instills pride in me 






satisfaction when I 
meet expectations 
4 It is important that we 
understand that our 
team’s purpose in the 
organization is to 
provide accurate 
financial data in order 
for our organization to 
make sound business 
decisions. 
It is important that we 
meet our performance 
goals in order that we can 
receive the bonuses 
budgeted for the 
members of our team.  
Transformational 
(Idealized Influence 
- Behavior):  
Specifies the 
importance of having 






clear what one can 
expect to receive 
when performance 
goals are achieved 
5 I’m excited and 
optimistic that our team 
will continue to achieve 
our goals, delivering a 
high level of customer 
service and technical 
expertise that our 
customers, both internal 
and external, deserve and 
respect. 
I’m tracking all of our 
team performance and 
customer service 
complaints to assess 
whether we are meeting 
our performance 
standards and are 
delivering a high level of 
customer service and 
technical expertise to our 




Motivation):  Talks 
optimistically about 














by Exception – 
Active): Keeps track 
of all mistakes 
 
Transactional (Mgmt 





and deviations from 
standards 
6 I’m interested and 
invested in staying 
focused on enhancing 
your individual 
strengths, ensuring your 
individual development, 
teaching and coaching 
you for individual 
success, and our success 
as a team. 
I’m interested in 
everyone staying focused 
on your respective tasks, 
prioritizing and only 
solving the problems that 
are chronic and have high 
visibility, and not 
spending time trying to 
improve processes that 
appear to be working just 








by Exception – 
Passive):  Shows that 
he/she is a firm 
believer in “If it ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it” 
 
Transactional (Mgmt 





before taking action 
7 If you need me for 
anything, you know I 
have an open door 
policy. I will rearrange 
my schedule if necessary, 
and I will offer relevant, 
practical, and 
constructive suggestions 
and new ideas to help 
you with your individual 
work assignments.  
If you need me to help 
you solve more severe 
issues, I suggest you try 
to book a meeting with 
me because I’m typically 
travelling for business 




– Attributed): Goes 
beyond self-interest 






Suggests new ways 











me to look at 





absent when needed 
 
8 I know each of you has 
individual needs, 
questions or concerns, 
and I encourage you to 
come speak with me 
anytime or directly after 
the meeting.  
I want you to send your 
critical questions or 
concerns to my assistant, 
and I will touch base to 
make an appointment to 
speak with you when I 




Treat me as an 
individual rather than 






Delays responding to 
urgent questions 
Total # of 
words 
213 207  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
